Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage by Alan J. Auerbach








This paper was prepared as part of the National Bureau of Economic
Research program in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics and
project in the Changing Roles of Debt and Equity in FinancingU.S.
Capital Fornation, which was financed by a grant from the American
Council of Life Insurance. It was presented at the NBER
Conferenceon Corporate Capital Structures in the United States,
Palm Beach, Florida, January 6and7,1983.I am grateful to Roger
Gordon for helpful discussion, Benjamin Friednan andothercon-
ference participants for useful comments, Gregory Clark for
assistancewith the research, andtheNBERforfinancial support.
Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.tIBER Working Paper #1151
June 1983
Real Determinants of Corporate LeveraL-:
Abstract
The U.S. corporate tax distorts the behavior of both real and
financialdecisions. With respect to the former, the variation in
depreciation allowances and investment tax credit provisions across types
of investments leads to widely vazying effective tax rates, especially
since 1981. Financial policy is distorted by the differential treatmentof
debtand equity. The wrposeofthis paperisto examine, using firm-level
panel data, the relationship between real and financial decisions by
corporations, in part to determine the extent to which these biases offset
orreinforce each other.
Our results are tentative and suggest that patterns of real and
financial behavior are only partially consistent with predictions of
various capital structure models (e.g. bankruptcy/agency cost, limited tax
shield)and thatthereis no obvious offset on the financial side to the
tax bias against investment in structures.
AlanJ. Auerbach
NationalBureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 868—3900 ext. 344I. Introductior
This study presents empirical estimates of the importance of dif-
ferent characteristics of corporations in influencing the propensity of such
corporations to finance their investments by borrowing. It also considers
the determinants of the type of borrowing finns do, by estimating jointly
thedeterminants of short—term and long—term borrowing. Such analysis is
important because there are several competing hypotheses about the deter-
minants of corporate borrowing that are difficult to choose among on the
basis of economic theory alone.
Ourtaskis facilitated by a rich data panel based on information
on nearly 200 corporations gathered from several sources, including infor-
mation on the composition of the capital stocks of individual firms. The
large number of variables representing firm characteristics facilitates the
evaluation of different modelsofleverage, while the availability of at
least 9yearsof data on each firm allows us to distinguish between short
runandlong rundeterminantsof borrowing.
Thetax law plays a central role in most models of corporate
leverage,and it isrecent changes in the tax law thatmotivate some of the
current interest in the cjuestion of what determines corporate borrowing.
One important issue to which ouch recent attention has been devoted is the
apparentlylarge bias builtintothe Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACES) for depreciable assets introduced by the Economic Recovery 'lhx Act
of1981. According to mostcalculations, the combination of the investment
taxcredit and either three—year or five—year write—off gave investments in
business equipment deductions and credits that exceeded in presentvalue
the benefits conveyed by immediate expensing. As is well—known, a cor-
porate tax with expensing (and without interestdeductibility) is "neutral"—2—
in the sense that it does not distort corporate investmentdecisions. Put
anotherway, the effective corporate marginal tax rate on investment is
zero. The presence of tax benefits in excess of expensing therefore
implies the existence of a marginal subsidy, i.e. a negative taxrate.
Indeed, the ACRS benefits are so generous thattheaggregate effective tax
rate on equipment investment is now essentiallyzero, after the
introduction in the 1982 tax act of a 50 percent basisadjustment for
investment credits received.1
Under the current law, structures do not receive thiseffective
tax exemption offered to equipnent. Though the tax lifetime formost
businessstructures (15 years) is now imich shorter than before, structures
typically receive no investment tax credits. As a result, estimates
suggest that the effective tax rates on structures now lie below the
statutory rate of I6percent(i.e., depreciation allowances are more
generousthan economic depreciation) but ziuch closer to this rate than
zero.2 Frther, nondepreciafleassets, such as land, do not qualify for
anyinvestmentincentives comparable to accelerated depreciation or the
investmenttax credit.
This suggests that thereexists a potentially serious distortion
facingthe choice of investmentmixby- corporations.3 However, such a
conclusion is necessarily valid only if a separation prevails between real
and financial corporate decisions. Under some models of debt—equity
choice,there nay be a tax advantage to the use of debt finance which is
dissipated by other costs to the firm as leverage increases. If these
costs relate systematicallyto the firm's investment mix, one wou1dexpect—3—
debt—equity ratios to differ for this reason. For example, one could
inagine a case in which leverage costs are lower for structures, wi.th the
additionalleverage this would make possible acting to offset the tax
disadvantagestructures face on the"real" side.
Thisis an example of the type of issue we seek to resolve in the
analysis thatfollows.We begin, in Section II, with a brief review of the
literature on optimal financial structure in the presence of taxation, with
particular emphasis on the choice of debt—equity ratio. Section III devel-
ops the different variants of the model of corporate borrowing that will
be estimated. Themodel shares with its predecessors the weakness of being
an ad hocmodel, rather than one derived rigorously from a firm's dynamic
optimizationproblem. However, this seems unavoidable in the current
context, and the model contains enough flexibility to be compatible with
different underlying behavioral hypotheses. Section IV presents a
description of the construction of the data set and the definitions of the
variables used in the regressions, and Section V presents the regression
results.
II. Theories of Corporate Leverage
Most theories of corporate leverage begin with the twin observa-
tions that corporate taxation appears to bias the choice of financial
policy completely toward debt, and that corporations typically finance
perhaps only one quarter of their accumulations of capital by actually
issuing debt.b The challenge is to explain whythesimple Modigliani—
Miller(1963) "all debt" result does not hold.—
Onesuggested answer wasprovidedby Miller (1971), who argued
thatthepresence of a progressive personal income tax with favorable
treatment of equity income (because of the partial exclusion and deferral
advantage associated with capital gains taxation) would lead to an equili-
briumwith firms facing the same cost of capital for debt and equity. In
this equilibrium, the tax advantage to debt would just be offset by a lower
before—tax return to equity holders. This model implies that in
equilibrium, taxation does not alterthe original finding of ?4odigliani and
Miller(1958) that financial policy is irrelevant. Moreover, itoffersno
reason whyfinancial policy would relate to real investment decisions or
othercharacteristics of firms.
Certain fundamental problems with the Miller result have been
pointed out by a number of authors. For example, the implicit tax rate on
municipal debt does not appear to be anywhere near the corporate rate sug-
gested by the model.S Moreover, the portfolios ofindividualinvestors
contain both equity and taxable debt, rather than exhibiting the segmenta-
tionthat Miller's hypothesis would predict. Thus, it seems that certain
additions nnst be nade to Miller's model to explain observed behavior.
Several of the models we consider have in common the property of
there being certain costs faced by firms that increase with leverage,
makinginteriordebt—equity ratios optimal in spite of the presence of a
partial tax advantage to debt finance. We consider these models next, dis-
cussing their empirically testable implications.—5—
A.Bankruptcy/Agency Cost Models
The most basic explanation for interior debt—equity ratios is
costly bankruptcy.6 It is important to emphasize thatthebankruptcy event
must not simplybecostly to some security holders in the sense of causing
a redistribution of resources among different classes. The possibility of
such redistributions could be allowed for adequately by an adjustment of
the normal coupon rate on debt. For potential bankruptcy to discourage the
issuance of debt, there mist be costs to the firm as a whole, such as legal
fees,court costs, or the loss on disposition of fixed assets (under
liquidation). tbreover, these costs must be sufficiently large to be
important relative to debt' a taxadvantage when bankruptcy isa likely
outcome.Thipirical evidence tends to refute this,? if we takethe observed
frequencyof bankruptcy as a rough probability measure.
In models of imperfect infornation, or dynamic models in which
financialand investment decisions occur at different times, additional
costs associated with bankruptcy can arise because of the inability of
bondholders to constrain the behavior of corporate managers. In a static
model, it nay be difficult for creditors to monitor the behavior of firms
(Ross, 1977). Indynamic models,managers may have the incentive to choose
socially inefficient investment plans, because they do not internalize the
effects of such plans on the value of outstanding long term debt (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). For example, firms with high levels of outstanding
long—term debt can choose to undertake very risky projects that increase
the probability ofbankruptcy. Under limited corporate liability, this
transfersresources from debt—holders to equity holders, and nay do so to a—6—
sufficientextent that risky projects with low total payoffs will dominate
(from the equity—holders' viewpoint) saferprojects with higher total pre-
sentvalue. The inefficency induced by this moral hazard isa social cost
that, presumably, imastbe borne bythe firmandits owners exante inthe
formof higher coupon payments to holders of long—term debt.It would
clearly be in the stockholders' interest to constrain the firm's behavior
in order to avoid such costs. While niechanisins to achieve this doexist
(e.g., bond covenants restricting future borrowing), it wouldbecostly if
notimpossible to use them to replicate the desired outcome.
Ifsuch costs to leverage remain, it msy be possible toidentify
differencesacross firmsin the level of such costs. For example, Myers
(1977)suggeststhat the moral hazard problem is more acute for firms whose
value derives from the anticipated rents from future investmentopportun-
itiesrather than from existingassetsor assets which the firm is com-
mitted to purchase. Presumably, there would also be less ofa problem for
firms with a narrow range of investment opportunities from ihichtochoose.
A second determinant of the level of agency costs should be the firm's
bankruptcyrisk, holding debt level constant. One can idel this using an
option—pricingframework byassuming that bankruptcy will occur ifthe
value of the firm as a whole drops below the level of claims against the
firm. The cost of such a "bankruptcy option" depends, following the
standard option—pricing results (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) on
the firm's value as wefl as the variance of its value over time.
Myersalso suggests thattheagency problem may give rise to
maturity—matching of financial claims and real assets •althoughhe also—7—
points out that the problem could be alleviated if firms engaged only in
short—term borrowing, since debt would always be fully redeemed before the
making of decisions about future projects. One could imagine the occur-
rence of either of these practices, but it is more difficult to derive a
model that produces them. One purpose of our empirical analysis is to
determine whether such behavior can actually be detected in practice.
B. Limited Tax Shield Models
The U.S. corporate income tax treats gains and losses asym-
metrically. Thsses ny be carried back up to three years to obtain a
refundof past taxes, buttheexcess of' any remaining losses mast be
carried forward, without interest, and subject to expiration after fifteen
years (seven years during this paper's sample period). Firms without tax-
able income need not be in financial distress or on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. However, the prospect of not being able to use the future tax
deductions provided by interest payments nakes debt less attractive, and
maycausefirms to limit their leverage. This is the essence of the
explanation offered by De Angelo and I4asulis (1960). It is attractive as
an explanation of debt policy because, unlike bankruptcy or agency costs,
tax costs are easily measured.
The hypothesis also hasanumber of testable implications. First,
firms with substantial loss carryforwards should, ceteris paribas, choose
to issue less debt. Second, firmsinvestingin assets with a greater
fraction of their total after—tax returns generated by investment tax
credits and depreciation deductions should also use less debt finance.
This is seen most simplyifwe imagine a project which costs one dollar and—5—
lasts for one period, yielding a gross return f subjectto taxation at rate
r, after a depreciation deduction equal to a fraction d of gross rents. If
r is the required after—tax rate of return required by the firm (in
addition to the return of the initial one dollar investment),then the
after—tax return satisfies:
(i) (l—r)f +tdf=(l+r)
This implies thatthefirm's taxable income is:
(2) f(1—d) =_________
whichdecreases with d. This result carries over directly to amultiperiod
modelif capital decays geometrically and depreciation deductions exceed
actual depreciation by a given fraction of income,say a. In this case,
taxableincome as a fraction of capital is a function only of a and not the
asset's depreciation characteristics.5 t.bre realistically, effectivetax
rateson assets differ not through variations in a but through differences
in the timing of depreciation deductions andqualificationfor investment
tax credits. Thus,the magnitude ofa firm's taxable income will depend
notonlyon the effective tax rate on the assets it owns butalsoon their
agestructure. For example, a unit of equipment under the original 1981
version of ACES would receive tax benefits in the first year of service
sufficient to shelter income equal to37 percentof the asset's purchase
price.9Onthe other band, this same asset iould receive no deductions at
allafter five years. Because acceleration of this sort (though not as
extreme) has been present for manyyears, the fraction of a fin's income—9—
shelteredby deductions and credits will generally increase with the rate
at which the firmaccumulates capital,given the firm's capital stock
composition.
A final implication of this modelofleverage determination is
thatthe firm's riskiness, this time as measured by the fluctuationsof
earningsbefore interest but after taxes1° should also discourage borrowing
because the asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses will lower the
expected tax savings from any given level of debt.
C. ¶1x Clientele !'bdels
If the Miller equilibrium holds, each firm will be completely
indifferent in its choice of debt—equity ratio. The foregoing models
suggest that asymmetries in the legal treatment of gains and losses, either
throughlimited corporate liability under bankruptcy or the lack of a loss
offset in the tax law, may cause the Miller result to break down. An
additionalreason why this may happen concerns the issue of whether
investors can obtain the same patterns of returns holding either only debt
or only equity. If they cannot, then a firm's financial policy will
generally matter, and will affect the welfare of different individuals
differently (Anerbach and King, 1983). In this case, the choice of
financial policy by a firm acting "in the interests of its shareholders"
depends on who these shareholders are. !txclienteles may develop for
differentfirms, with investors in hier personal tax brackets having a
greater relative preference for the firms they own to finance through
retentions rather than borrowing (Auerbach, 19814). Put another way, such
investors would prefer to borrow on their own account, rather than have— lU—
firmsdo it for them, if their personal tax rate is sufficiently high.
Since rst equity finance cones through retained earnings, this suggests
that a corporation facing increasing costs to leverage will use less debt
finance, the higher is the tax rate of its clientele.
D. Summary
There are several empirical inlications of the foregoing models
about overall debt—equity ratios. Risky firms should borrow less, whether
risk is measured by fluctuations in valuation or in earnings. Fst growing
firms should borrow less, because of their higher ratio of growth
opportunities to existing capital, and because of their greater tax shield
front depreciation deductions and investment tax credits. Firms investing
in assets receiving generous tax treatment, such as equipment, generally,
relative to structures and land, should use less debt for the same reason.
Firms with high—tax clienteles should use less debt than others.
We have more limited predictions about the maturity structure of
debtthat firms will choose. If firms engage in maturity matching, we
would expect to see a smaller fraction of long—term debt used to finance
equipment, which typically depreciates more rapidly. We might also expect
that firms eschewing long—term debt for agency reasons would shift to
short—term debt rather than equity finance. Particularly with respect to
the question of maturity structure, it is Important that the model we
estimate has the capacity of separating long—term determinants of leverage
from those that msy dominate borrowing decisions in the short run.—11-
111. A ModelofCorporate Borrowinc
Our approachdiffers from thattaken intaich of' the literature on
financialdecisions in two majorrespects. We model the borrowing by
individualfirms as a continuous process. That is, our model attempts to
explain changes in levels of debt rather than discrete new issues. This
seems appropriate for firms aslargeas those in our sample. We also
expressall variables in real terms, corrected for inflation. The process
bywhich such variables were obtained from bookvalue data is described in
thenext section. .irmodel is similar in some respects to that estimated
by Taggart (1977) using quarterly aggregate time series data. However,
there are several important differences and allowances for the ability to
distinguish effects across firms as well as over time. We estimate both a
single equation model for all debt and a two—equation model to explain
short—term and long—term debt.
The basic model is intended to capture three characterizations of
firm borrowing behavior.
(i) a long run target debt—equityratio based on the factors
outlinedin Section II;
(2) a lag in adjustment to changes in this desired ratio; and
(3) the short—run importance of cash flow constraints.
To illustrate the interaction of these points, consider a firm tth a najor
tax loss carryforward that wishes to undertake an investment project. This
firm nay wishto useonly retained earnings, but sufficient earnings may
not be available, particularly as the loss carryforward probably indicates
low cashflowaswellaslow taxable income.Hence, we might observe this—it—
firm borrowing more in the short run than would be predicted by the
underlying attractiveness of debt finance. It is important that our model
allow such borrowing to be distinguished from borrowing based on
longer—term considerations. A simple cross—section regression would not be
capable of separating such factors.
We outline first the model of aggregate firm borrowing. The
long—run desired debt—assets ratio b* is taken to be a linear function of
several variables. These variables vary over time,overfirms, or over
bothtime and firms. We assume that firms borrow to close part of the gap
between the current ratio of debt to assets and the desired one,l1butalso
areinfluenced by current cash flowneeds.We define this cash flow
deficitas the change in the firm's debt—assets ratio that Mould be
required for the firmto finance its new investmentout of internal funds
and borrowing, while at the same time maintaining dividends at their trend
level and avoiding the issuance of new shares. The motivation for this
variable is thatbothnew share issues and dividend cuts are activities
generallytaken to be costly to the firm: the former because of tax
considerations, the latter because of the undesirable signal it my
convey.12
The cashflow deficit variable is constructed by subtracting from
the sum of gross investment and trenddividendsl3 (uses) the sumof'
after—tax cash flow (after—tax earnings plus depreciation) and the product
of the current debt—assets ratio and gross investment (sources), and
dividing the difference by assets. This variable equals zero when
investment and trend dividends can be exactly covered by internal funds—13—
plus borrowing at the current debt—assets ratio. If it is positive, an
increase in the debt—assets ratio will be needed if dividend cuts and new
shareissues are to be avoided.
This variable differs from the standard "external deficit"
variable in its inclusion of trend rather than actual dividends. Moreover,
it includes borrowing at the current debt—assetratio on the sources side
becausethe partial adjustment nodel is expressed in debt—asset ratios
rather than in levels of debt. Fbrimalating the model in this way allows us
to distinguish between increases in the level of debt as the firm grows and
fluctuations araind this trend that result in changes in the incentives to
use debt finance.14




Where fft is the firm's deficit as just defined, bit is the firm's ratio of
debt to assets, (the latter equal to its fixed capital stock plus working
capita) and
(4) b7 =
isthe firm's long run targetdebt—assets ratio based on the determinants
fit.
The model that distinguishes between the ratio of long—term debt
to assets (L)andthat of short—term debt to assets (s) has two equations
of a forni similar to (3):l4—
(5a) it =x1(t; — L_)
+ — +
(5b)
As1= A2t— + — +
whereeach equation includes not only its owngap betweendesired and
actual levels butthatfrom the other equation. Similarly, we define £*
and 8* by:
(6a) =
(6b)sa • at_2 ..it
Becausewe mice no prior distinction between the variables
determining£* and those determining s", the vectors and a2 can not be
identified using equations (5a) or (5b) alone (unless the cross effects
and A2 are zero). However, they are exactly identified by the equations
together. Further, since the twoequationshave thesameset of explana-
tory variables, naximumlikelihoodestimation of the system is accomplished
by performing ordinary least squares on the equations separately.
The vector includes dumnr variables for each firm and for
each year (save the last). The former are included to account for
interfirm differences in the desired ratio of debt to assets, while the
latter are intended to pick up year to year differences in the incentive to
borrow thatarecommon across firms,as might be caused by macroeconomic
fluctuations(e.g., changes in the inflation rate or the term structure).
Indeed, an interesting side result of the estimation procedure is the—15—
patternof these dumn' variables over time.
Also available are many other measures of firm attributes, but
most of these are either constant or change slowly over the sample period,
making it impossible to include them in regressions along with the
individualfirm effects. Only the firm's tax loss carryforward has
sufficient year—to—year variance to be included in the initial estimation
procedure. The remainder, however, may be used in a second estimation
stage to explain the variation in the individual firm constants, in a
cross—section regression. The need for this two stage procedure would be
obviated if the firm dummies were omitted from the first estimation stage,
and the various firm characteristics included in the vector x directly.
However,such a procedure wouldintroduce a large, firm specific error
(equalto the unexplained part of the firm's ownfixedeffect) thatwould
likelybe correlated with other explanatory variables, leading to
inconsistentestimation.15
IV. Data
The dataused in this paper come from three sources. The basic
data on firms comefrom a copy of the Compustat tape covering theyears
1958to1977.Wornthis tape, we selected those firms for which all obser-
vations of a subset of key variables were available. Long—term debt
corresponds to the Couçustat category of all debt maturing in nre than one
year. &iort—term debt also includes long—term debt maturing within one
year.Thtal assets equals fixed capital, plus inventories, plus other
current assets net of non—debt current liabilities. (An alternative
approachto the measuremant of total assets is to use the total market—16—
value of equity plus debt. This is discussed below in Section V.) Balance
sheet and income statement data on long—term debt, capital, inventories and
earnings were corrected from book value through a series of steps described
in detail in Auerbach (1984). We review these steps briefly below.
Long—term debt was converted, to market value using assumptions
about the initial age structure of such debt in 1958, the maturity of new
issues, and the coupon rate on such issues. From this corrected data
series, we calculated the change in the market value of outstanding long
term debt due to interest fluctuations, adding this plus the inflation gain
onnet financial liabilities (long—term debt plus short—term debt less
financial assets) to book earnings.
Inventories were corrected according to information on the pri-
mary method of inventory accounting used by each firm.Theinventory
valuation adjustment so obtained was subtracted from book earnings to
correct for their inclusion of excess inventory profits.
Depreciationwas estimatedby-assuming that bookdepreciation is
correctexcept for the fact that it is based on initial asset prices. The
method used calculates thatrateof declining balance (exponential) depre-
ciation, 6,that, when applied to a perpetual inventory calculation for
updating capital stocks beginning with the 1958 book value for net fixed
capital, yields the stated 1971bookvalue.(If all assets actually were
writtenoff, and did depreciate,at a single rate, this calculation would
yieldthe correct rate.) Using this estimate of 6, we generated a cor-
rected series for capital stocks and depreciation using the perpetual
inventorymethod, starting in 1958. As with debt and inventories, the dif——17—
ferencebetween corrected and book depreciation was subtracted from book
earnings. The measure of corrected cash flow entering into the computation
of the cash flow deficit f is simply the sum of corrected after—tax profits
plus corrected depreciation.
After such corrections, all variables were deflated to be
expressed in constant dollars rather than current dollars. hch firm's
earningsgrowth rate was estimatedbyfittinga quadratic trend over the
period1963—1971forthe firm's corrected earnings, before interest but
after taxes, and taking the growth rate along this trend at the sample
midpoint, 1970. The variance of firm earnings was approximated by the
sample variance around this trend, normalized by the squared trend value in
1970.
A second source of data is the actual 1GC reports filed by the
individualfirms. These reports contain more detailed information than is
providedby Compustat. In particular, many firms listseparate capital
stocks, depreciation and investment for several classes of capital. The
most detailed common breakdown is transportation equipment, other equip-
ment, structures and land, with sane firms aggregating the first twoand
last two of these categories. Firms that did not provide uninterrupted
data between 1969 and 1971, or that did not follow this general asset class-
ification, were omitted from the sample. For the remainder, disaggregated,
corrected capital stocks were created following the perpetual inventory
method described above, using 1968 and 1971 net capital stocks and investment
and depreciation reported for the intervening years. 9ich capital stocks
were not used directly, but were divided by their annual sum to generate— lb—
capitalstock fractions. These fractions were averaged over time for each
firm and used in the second estimation stage as explanatory variables.
Of the 189 firms for which capital stocks by asset category were
conuted, 1149 have separate categories for land and structures, while 140
combine the two into a single category. Forty firms report separate sta-
tistics for transportation equipment, while the remaining firms lump all
equipmenttogether. The average capital stock depreciation rates derived
for each category appear realistic, though there is substantial variance in
these rates across firms. The sumnary statistics for these depreciation
rates are reported in Table 1.(It should be rememberedthatthe equipment
categoryincludes all equipment for 1149 firms, and thatthe structures
categoryincliHes land as well for iO firms.)Thecategory nans are quite







Structures 189 .072 .006
Land 1149 .025 .010




In the regressions reported in this paper, we omit thefirmsfor
whichno structures/land breakdown is available, and add together the—19—
equipmentcategories for those linusreporting transportationequipment
separatei.y. This leaves us with 1b3 firms in the final sample.1?
The final source of data is the CRSP tape, which provided daily
return and dividend data. In an earlier paper (Auerbach, 1983), we per-
formed aseries of regressions on daily datafor each of the rinG in our
sample,using observations for every tenth tradingdaybetween 1963 and






whereandd. are the stock's capital gains per dollar of stock and divi-
dend per dollar, respectively, and m and r are the rate of change in the
Standardand Pbor's Index and the Treasury bill rate. This equation
derives froma version of the Capital Asset Pricing ?tdel with progressive
personaltaxes, with 02 a measure of the firm's "beta". The term 61 ought
to be —1 in the absence of taxes. Over the sample of firms for which (7)
was estimated, 01 has an average of —.787. Under certain assumptions, this
divergencemaybe attributed tothe differential taxation of dividends and
capital gains, and the variation in 01 across firms may be traced to dif-
ferences in tax clienteles.lB The estimated values (Oi+l) are used in the
present paper as estimates of the clientele tax rate and beta of each firm.
To estimate the variance in valueforeach firm,wetake the variance over
thissame sample(excluding ex dividend days)ofeach firm's proportional
capital gains, which yields anormalizedmeasure of the variance of the
firm's equity value, and xmaltiply it by the sampleratioof equity to debt—20—
plusequity for the firm, yielding an overall volatility measure analogous
tothe "unlevered" beta.
V. Estimation Results
For convenience, we rewrite the one—equation and two—equation
modelshere:
(kie equation
Ab =x(b* —b )+yf
it0 it it—i Qit
b!a •x. it_O _]t
Two equations
AL A(L* —L —s it1 it it—iI it it—ilit
As A(L* —L —s )+vf it2 it it—i2 it it—l 2it
L a •x = it ..l it 'It _2 .,it
The measure of total assets by which we divide measures of debt
to form ratios includes corrected book values of both fixed capital and
working capital, as described in Section IV. However, one could argue that
analternative, market value—based measure is preferable, one that simply
adds up the value of all claims against the firm, including common and
preferred stock, long—term debt and short—term debt. The benefit of
using the second method is that it nay more accurately reflect the value of
a firm's than any measure based on book values, even "corrected" ones. For
example, a firm with ener'—intensive plant and equipment would suffer a
loss in value if enerr prices rose unexpectedly, because the discountedvalue of the quasi—rents anticipated to flow from its assets would fall.
If measured properly, this would appear as capital stock depreciation, but
such a measure is difficult to obtain except indirectly through narket
valuation. Similarly, a firm with large amounts of income from intangibles
(goodwill,patents, nnopoly rents, etc.) mayhaveacomprehensive stock of
income—generatingassets nuch larger than the measured capital stock.
Arguing against the use of the value—based method is the uncertainty about
the equilibriun ratio of market value to the correctly measured value of
assets. This aunts to a question about the long—runvalueof Tobin's q.
For example, under a Miller—type equilibrium with retained earnings serving
as the marginal source of finance, firmswould be indifferent in their
choiceof debt—equity ratio but the value of debt plus equity would
increasewith leverage (Auerbach, 1979) .19 Inaddition, it is unclear how
nich firms react to volatile year—to—year fluctuations in value in -
determiningdesired levels of debt.
Since each of these methods ofdefining assets has arguments in
Itsfavor, we estimated regressions for both the book—based (Method i) and
market—based (Method ii) asset measures. The results for the first
estimation stage were relatively similar, so only those for Method I are
discussed in the text. These are shown in Table 2. (An analogue to 'lble
2 for t&thod II is presented and discussedin the Appendix.)
Theattribute vector, x, includes firm dummies, time dummies, and
the previous year's tax loss carryforward.20 The estimates are for the




(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) All Long—Term




LaggedLong—Term Debt(t) —.3o .040
(.021) (.005)
Lagged Short—Term Debt (s) .201 —-738
(.108) (.026)
Cash Flaw Deficit (r) —.015 .005 —.012
(.029). (.028) (.067)
Taxless Carryforward (x103) —.356 —.296 —.031
(.139) (.136) (.032)




1970 —.027 —.031 .004
(.005) (.005) (.ooi)
1971 —.015 —.017 .004
(.005) (.005) (.ooi)
1972 —.008 —.007 .001
(.005) (.005) (.001)
1973 —.009 —.009 .001
(.oos) (.005) (.001)
1974 —.018 —.018 —.001
(.oo) (.005) (.ooi)
1975 —.0148 —.049 .001
(.005) (.005) (.001)
1976 —.020 —.020 .001
(.005) (.005) (.001)
SSR 2.53 2.31 .136
.208 .239 .467
Standard errors in parentheses.—23—
Thefirst columnof Th.ble2 shows the estimates for the single
ecjuation model, while the second and third present the reduced form
estimates for the two equation model. An interesting feature of all three
regressions is the relatively large size of the coefficient on the own
lagged variable ——theannual adjustment speed. These speeds, 27.4 percent
per year for all debt, 30.4 percent for long—term debt, and 73.8 percent
forshort—term debt are particularly large given that they relate not to
levels of debt but ratios of debt to assets. A second point is that the
cross effects between long—term and short—term debt are both positive and
significant, indicating a substitutability of the two forms of finance.
The cash flow deficit is insignificant inallthree equations, a somewhat
surprisingresult. It suggests, for example, that a drop in cash flow,
holding investment constant, will not affect borrowing independently of
other factors. This is rather implausible, and suggests that a more
elaborate specification would be useful. The tax loss carryforward is
negative in all three regressions, as predicted, and significant in the
first two.
From the estimates in ¶Ikble 2, we can solve for the annual
desired debt—asset ratios for anyfirm. As a representative example, we
consider a firm with no cash flow deficitandno tax loss carryforward, and
witha firm effect equal to the mean of such effects over firms(shown in
Table 2).
The estimated targets b*, £*ands' for debt in each sample year
areshown inThble 3.21 The numbers are reasonable in magnitude, compared
toobserved aggregate debt—asset ratios. None of the three series showsTb1e 3















.281. .185 .017 .202
1910 .157 .136 .016 .152
1971 .202 .1814 .017 .201
1972 .227 .214 .0114 .228
1973 .225 .208 .015 .223
19714 .189 .1T8 .011 .189
1975 .080 .073 .007 .080
1976 .184 .171 .013 .184
1977 .256 .239 .015 .254
Calculated for a firm with mean fixed effect and no cash flow deficit or tax
loss carryforward.any noticeabletrend over the period, and the estimates tend to nov'
together. Anindication that the aggregate equation fits reasonably well
relativeto the two equation system comes from the fact that the sum of the
estimated values of s and j*isgenerally very close to b*. The year to
yearmovements reflect those actually observed in the aggregate (see, for
example, the statistics in Robert Taggert's paper in this volume), such as
the decline in leverage from 1973 to 1915 and increase thereafter to 1911.
However, the movements from year to year in Table 3arelarger in
magnitude, since they reflect changes in long—run targets rather than
actually attained values.
We turn next to the second stage of our estimation, that of
explaining differences in the desired debt—assets ratios of different finns
using finn characteristics. We perform cross section regressions for
long—term debt, short—term debt, and all debt, with the dependent variables
in the regression being the estimated structural coefficient of the finn's
dumury variable in the expressions for L, s and bTM, respectively. Because
the two methods of defining total assets (corrected book versus value)
provide somewhat different results, we present both sets, in Tables 4and5,
respectively.The explanatory variables in each table, all described
above, are "unlevered" variances of finn value and earnings, the firm's
"clientele tax rate" estimated from ex dividend day regressions, the
estirated rate of depreciation of the firm's capital stock, and variables
reflecting the composition of the firm's assets. For the first definition
of assets (corrected book value) we include the fraction of fixed capital
accounted for by structures, equipment, and land (which sum to one),—26-
multiplied by the ratio of fixed capital to total assets. This yields the
fraction that each component of fixed capital accounts for of the firm's
total assets, fixed and current. The coefficients of these fractions may
be interpreted as the optimal debt—assets ratio for the particular type of
asset, relative to that for current assets. When the market value—based
measure of assets is used, we mist adopt some convention for allocating the
difference between market value and the value of assets carried over from
thefirst measure. We choose to aflocate the entire difference to
intangible assets previously unaccounted for, and include in the regression
the fraction of the new capital stock measure represented by goodwill (the
remaining three fractions, for structures, land and equipment, are scaled up
or down accordingly). This fraction has a highly significant and negative
coefficient in all three regressions reported in ble5.The absolute
value of the coefficient on goodwill is nearly as large as that of the
constant in the aggregate regression, indicating that very little debt is
used to finance goodwill, as we have measured it. This nay be interpreted
in at least two ways. One nytakeit as an indication that firms finance
intangible assets with less debt, in accordance with the theory of agency
(atleast to the extent that the intangibles indicate morediscretionon
the part of the finn's managers). On the other hand, this finding nay also
reflect the possibility that managers base their borrowing decisions on
book asset measures (perhaps corrected for inflation) but not on stock
market values.
Except for the asset composition variables, the explanatory
variables have very similar coefficients in the two tables, although theyare not necessarily consistent with the predictions of the various theories
discussed in Section II. The clientele tax rate variable is always
insignificant, perhaps reflecting on its quality as a tax rate prov. The
growth rate and variance of earnings always have positive coefficients,
usually significant. Neither of these results has an obvious explanation.
The rate of capitaldepreciation always exerts a positive effect, which also
was not predicted. However, this effect is only significant for short—term
borrowing,consistent with the notion of nturity—matching. The variance
ofvalue does perform as predicted, butneversignificantly so. Allin
all,these results provide rather negative evidence with respect to all of
the theories of leverage presented above.
The coefficients of the capital stock fractions differ
considerably between bles 1 and 5,presumablybecause of the inclusion
inthe latter table of the goodwill fraction. Whenthe first,
corrected—bookneasure of assets is used, only equipment has a significant
coefficient, which is positive. When goodwill is added both to the ntasure
of assets and to the regression as a fraction of the new asset ntasure, the
coefficient of structures beconts significantly negative, and thatofland
significantly positive.While there is no indication thatstructures are
financed with greater leverage than equipment, the instability of these
results is quite disturbing. Given that the allocation of the entire
difference between market and corrected book values to goodwill is











































































SSR 1.35 1.10 .022
2 .157 .145 .157











(Finn Effect) Borrowing (b*) Borrowing (L*)Borrowing(*)
Independent Variable
Constant (xA) .187 .191 .002
(.oIo) (.038) (.006)
Variance of Value (x103) —.080 —.086 .006
(.ois) (.070) (.oi')
Clientele Tax Rate —.007 —.010 .003
(.019) (.017) (.003)
Variance of Earnings .189 .148 .031
(.116) (.110) (.017)
Growth Rate .640 .591 .044
(.166) (.156) (.024)
Rate of Capital .2214 .175 .0142
Depreciation (.180) (.170) (.026)
FractionStructures —.548 —.480 —.o6
(.227) (.2114) (.033)
FractionLand .652 .563 .079
(.206) (.195) (.030)
Fraction Eiuipnent .012 —.006 —.004
(.042) (.040) (.oo6)
FractionGoodwill —.159 —.142 —.015
(.033) (.032) (.oo5)
SSR .786 .697 .017
.511 .484 .371
Standard errors in parentheses.—30—
VI. Conclusion
Ourpartial adjustment models of borrowing suggest rapid speeds of
adjustment, particularlyfor short—term debt, and desired ratios of debt,
andits long—term and short—term components, to assets during the period
1969—19T7that, while not constant, exhibit no obvious trend. Some firm
characteristicsare insignificant in explaining cross—sectional differences
in leverage, while others appear to contradictthe prediction of various
theories in their impacts. The effects of firm growth rates on the level
of borrowing is inconsistent with the predictions of "agency" models of
leverage.The positive effects of earnings variance on borrowing appears
to contradict the "tax shield" borrowing model, butthetax loss
carryforwardhasthenegative effect thatthis model would predict.
Theresults do not indicate that firmsborrow more to invest in
structuresthan in equiçxnent but the results here vary substantially
according to the measure of assets used. Richer models of firm behavior
appear to be required before more definitive conclusions can be reached.—31—
Appendix
Thisappendix presents in Th.ble 2.A the first—stage estimation
results for the alternative definition of firm assets, based on unrket
value rather than corrected book value. The only important difference is
in the significant coefficients in all three equations of the cash flow
deficit, which had insignificant coefficients in all three equations in
Table 2. One suspects that this result is attributable to large short—run
fluctuations in value being ignored by firms. For example, a large decline
in the value of the firm would increase the cash flow gap, since "normal"
debt increases (the current debt to assets ratio multiplied by the change
inassets) would be negative. At the saatime, the observed change in the
debt—assetsratio would be positive, even if there were no changeinthe
level of debt,becauseof the decline in the value of assets. It is
difficult in this undel to distinguish between the hypothesis that firms
simply ignore changes in value, and the hypothesis that thereduction in
desireddebt is just offset by the increase in the cashflow deficit. To
sort out this problem, one would need a model that disaggregatesdifferent
sources of the cash flow deficit.Thbie 2k
Models ofBorrowing: Alternative Assets Definitiou
(2.Al) (2.A2) (2.3A)
All Long—Term Short—Term
Dependent Variable Borrowing (Ab) Borrowing (AL)Borrowing(As)
Independent Variable
Lagged Debt (b) -.44i
(.021)




Cashflow Deficit (r) .346 .318 .025
(.019) (.019) (.oo4)
TaxLoss carryforward (x103).051 .063 .042
(.157) (.153) (.036)
Firmtkznimies(Mean) .101 .099 .003
YearDummies:
1969 —.032 —.039 .003
(.006) (.oo6) (.001)
1970 —.038 —.043 .005
(.006) (.oo6) (.ooi)
1971 —.043 —.044 .003
(.oo6) (.oo6) (.001)
1972 —.035 —.034 .0004
(.oo6) (.oo6) (.ooi)
1973 .009 .005 .004
(.oo6) (.oo6) (.ooi)
1974 .025 .022 .003
(.oo6) (.006) (.001)
1975 —.046 —.050 .002
(.oo6) (.oo6) (.ooi)
1916 —.024 —.025 .002
(.006) (.006) (.ooi)




1. See Hulten and Robertson(1982).
2. For example, see the Economic Reportofthe President (1962), or
Hulten and Robertson (1982).
3.Ajustification for the use of effective tax rates in welfare analy-
sis is given by Auerbach (1982).
4.Sucha fraction istypicalof the timeseriesdebt—capital ratios
calculatedby Gordon and Malkiel (1961).
5. Gordon and Maikiel (1981) present results suggesting a value between
.2 and .3, versus a corporate tax rate (historically) of at least .46.
6.See, for example, Scott (1976).
7. See, for example, Miller (1971).
8. This foflows from the fact that the user cost of capital to which
the mrginal product of capitalwill be set equals
c=q(r+6)(l_t6+1'))/(l—r), where q is the relative capital
r+6




9.This results from a 15 percent deduction and a 10 percent investment
tax credit, which shields income of 22 percent.
10. Onewouldsubtract nottaxesactually paid butthosethatwouldbe
paidby the firm wereit entirely financed by equity.
11. This partial adjustment specification imposes a common, geometric lag
structure on the different determinants of the desired ratio of debt
to assets. Fxrther research on this topic might consider more— 34—
generallag specifications to determine whether these restrictions an
justified.
12. These points are quite common in literature. See, for example,
Auerbach(i98i).
13. Trend dividends are calculated by regressing the firm's annual
dividends on a constant, timeandtime squared over the period
1963—1977.
1IJ.An alternative approach, used in an earlier version of'this paper,
wouldbe to detrend levels of debt.
15. Additional problems of inconsistency could arise if the remaining
errors for each firm were correlated over time, even after being
purged of fixed effects. An attempt to control for this using two
stage least squares, with the lagged debt—assets ratios and cash flow
deficit variables regressed in thefirststage on several lagged
vaines of the firm's sales proved unsuccessful, in thatthesales
variables proved to be very poor instruments. No other obvious
candidates came to mind. Given the rapid adjustment speeds found in
the basic ntdel (Table 2 below) and the usual tendency of positive
autocorrelation to bias such speeds downward, one iy hope that the
potential problem is not a serious one here.
16. SeeHultenand Wykoff (1981) for example.
17.There are l19 firms with complete capital stock data (see Table i)
but six had missing values for one of the other explanatory variables,
the tax loss carryforward.—3)—
18. These interpretations are not universally accepted. Seethe criti-
cisms ofMiller and Scholes (1982), for example.
19.This occursbecausea firm's equity is valued at (A—B). where A
is the value of a firm's assets, B the value of its debt, and is
a constant less than one, based on the relative tax rates on dividends
and capital gains.
20. In a few cases in which this value wasmissing,we used the one from
twoyearsbefore.
21. Note that to obtain j*ands*, one mist solve for the structural
parametersin a1 anda2 in(6)fromthe reduced formestinates of the
twoequation system for £ and s.—36—
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